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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, a Utah
corporation, doing business in the state of
Idaho,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Supreme Court No. 45764

Twin Falls County District Court
Case No. CV42-16-2539

vs.
SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho
corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an
individual; and DAVID C. SKINNER, an
individual;
Defendants/Respondents.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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HONORABLE RANDY J . STOKER, DISTRICT JUDGE PRESIDING
Michael D. Danielson
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P.O. Box 366
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510 Lincoln Street
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Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and
for Twin Falls County, Honorable Randy J. Stoker, presiding.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Kenworth filed its Appellant's Brief on 6/21/18. The Skinners subsequently filed their
Respondents ' Brief on 7/18/18 and Kenworth submits the following reply to the arguments
contained therein.
II.
A.

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred in Its Approach to the First Element of a Prima
Facie Unjust Enrichment Claim.

In its Appellant's Brief, Kenworth argues that the trial court erred in its application of the
first element of an unjust enrichment claim. Kenw01ih pointed out that a benefit is considered
conferred, not just when one "satisfies the debt of another," but also when one "gives the other
some interest in money, land, or possessions, performs services beneficial to or at the request of
the other. .. or in any other way adds to the other's advantage." Med. Recovery Services, LLC v.
Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc., 157 Idaho 395,398,336 P.3d 802, 805 (2014). The trial
court determined that with regard to Kenworth's decision to pay off the residual amounts owing
under the lease, no debt was satisfied, and that therefore no benefit was conferred, completely
ignoring the remainder of the language from Med. Recovery Services. 1
In their Respondents' Brief, the Skinners double down on that error, refusing to address the
remainder of the Med. Recovery Services test and claiming that "It is true that there was no debt to
satisfy, which does cause the first prong to fail." Respondent's Brief, p. 5. Again, although

1

Kenworth also argues that the trial court erred in finding that no debt was satisfied, but that argument will not be
re-addressed h ere.
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Kenworth asserts that a debt was satisfied, this conclusion ignores the fact that Kenworth both (1)
performed a service beneficial to the Respondents and (2) added to their advantage. As such, the
trial court's limited analysis of the first prong of Kenworth's prima facie unjust enrichment claim
was error.
B.

The District Court Erred When It Considered and Applied the Unpled "Officious
Intermeddler" Affirmative Defense.

The Skinners, in their Respondents' Brief, accuse Kenworth of misleading the Court and
making up law because "[n]o cases discuss the requirement that the [officious intermeddler]
doctrine be pied as an affirmative defense." Respondents' Brief, p. 8. However, Kenworth has
been clear in its position that, although Idaho caselaw has never explicitly stated that the officious
intermeddler defense is an affirmative defense, it is an affirmative defense and has been treated as
such by Idaho's courts.2 See Appellant's Brief, p. 9. That position remains true for the reasons
stated in Kenw01ih's prior brief and for the reasons contained therein, Kenworth simply requests
that this Court so hold.
The Skinners also argue that the officious intermeddler doctrine need not be affirmatively
pied or be waived because "I.R.C.P. 8(c)(l) lists the defenses that must be pied affirmatively, and
the list does not include the officious intermeddler doctrine." Respondents' Brief, p. 8. But, the
list contained in Rule 8(c)(l) is not exhaustive. 3 Garren v. Butigan, 95 Idaho 355, 358, 509 P.2d
340, 343 (1973) ("Although I.R.C.P. 8(c) enumerates nineteen affirmative defenses, the listing is
not intended to be exhaustive or exclusive."). As mentioned in Kenworth's Appellant's Brief, an
affirmative defense is one in which "the defendant has the burden of introducing evidence and

2

One of the purposes ofan appeal is to have certain areas of the law, heretofore unaddressed, clarified.
Rule 8(c)(l) reads "In Responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative
defense, including:... " (emphasis added). Nowhere does the Rule limit itself to the affirmative defenses listed
therein.
3
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persuading the finder of fact. .. which the Plaintiff may defeat by the introduction of evidence of
his own." Appellant's Brief, p. 10 (citing to Williams v. Paxton, 98 Idaho 155, 163,559 P.2d 1123,
1131, n.l ( 1976)). Based on the following statement from the Respondents Brief, this is exactly
how the defense was treated by defense counsel at trial:
Finally, in order to ensure that the officious intermeddler doctrine applied,
Skinner's counsel had to confirm at trial with each of Kenworth's witnesses that
there was no agreement made with Skinner. Once it was confirmed that there was
no agreement, then Skinner's counsel was able to conclusively find that the
officious intermeddler doctrine did apply. Once Kenworth rested his case, and both
parties were preparing for their closing briefs, Skinner's counsel was able to apply
the doctrine in full. Based on these facts, raising the doctrine earlier in the case
would have been impossible for Skinner.

Respondents ' Brief, p. 8
Ignoring the fact that such a statement contradicts a prior statement made by defense
counsel to Judge Shindurling, on the record, that he didn't even discover the doctrine until
researching for his closing brief after trial,4 the scenario described fits the Paxton language
regarding affirmative defenses exactly. The Respondents argue that they sought to elicit certain
evidence at trial (e.g., that there was no agreement) that they thought would establish the defense,
allowing them to argue it in their closing brief, but that they couldn't be sure until after trial. 5 The
problem is, in failing to raise it in pleadings before trial or even to move to amend at the close of
evidence, they failed to put Kenworth on notice as required by I.R.C.P. 8 or to give Kenworth any
chance to respond. Therefore, the defense was waived and its application by the trial court was
error.

4

Supp. Tr. 6:4-7 ("And I didn't find the cases on officious intermeddler until I was doing my written closing
argument. But somehow on my mind it was-there was no agreement.").
5
The Respondents' assertion that raising the doctrine earlier (i.e. either before or during trial) was impossible is
makes absolutely no sense. Defenses are routinely pied on the chance that they may potentially apply at trial.
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Additionally, the Respondents' argue that Kenworth's reason for conferring a benefit on
the Skinners is invalid based on Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378, 941 P.2d 350 (Ct. App. 1997).
That argument is inapposite, as the facts in Becker and the those involved here couldn't be further
apart.
The Becker Court denied an unjust enrichment claim on the basis of unclean hands, as
plaintiff in that case, who was obligated under an agreement with the city to acquire notarized
authorization from property owners before acting on their behalf, failed to do so. The issue of the
officious intermeddler doctrine was only discussed in a concurring opinion, and even then, that
concurrence relied heavily on the fact that the plaintiff not only failed to get the defendants'
consent before beginning work, the defendants objected to the work, requested that the plaintiff
cease all work through their attorney, and even tried to barricade their property to keep the plaintiff
out. Id. at 385, 941 P.2d at 357. Becker does not stand for the proposition, as the Respondents
assert, that a valid reason for conferring a benefit cannot exist where consent has not been given
and where the party conferring the benefit also stands to benefit therefrom.
The Respondents admit that Kenworth acted for the purpose of keeping the Skinners in
business. Respondents' Brief, p. 9. That purpose is valid, despite the Skinners' lack of express
consent. 6 Therefore, even if the officious intermeddler defense was not waived, the trial court
erred by recognizing and then subsequently ignoring Kenworth's valid reason for taking the action
that it did.7

6
The trial court recognized this reason but then overlooked it in its analysis. R. 193 (Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law).
7
Again, the trial court recognized that an individual is not an intermeddler "if such a person has a valid reason for
conferring the benefit, such as protecting an interest," but then cursorily determined that because there "was no
testimony that Kenworth had an interest in the trucks," Kenworth was an officious intermeddler. R. 190-191, 193
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw). It was as if the trial court read the language from Curtis so as to limit
valid reasons for intermeddling to situations wherein an interest is being protected. Such is simply not the case.
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III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons argued above, as well as those provided in prior briefing in this appeal, the
Appellant respectfully requests the relief sought in its Appellant's Brief.
DATED this 6111 day of August, 2018.
Respectfully Submitted,
BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD,
HIGH & MOLLERUP, PLLC
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By_ _"_:_
Michael D. Danielson
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be served upon the following attorney in the
following manner:
Joe Rockstahl
ROCKSTAHL LAW OFFICE, CHTD.
510 Lincoln Street
Twin Falls, ID 83301
(Attorney for Defendants/Respondents)

Hand Delivered
U.S. Mail
Fax (208) 734-8820
Email
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